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NOTES AND ComrIxENTs
From the language used in this decision it appears that Kentucky
might now require only a reasonable necessity for an implied reserva-
tion of an easement based on a quasi-easement. However, the court
in the opinion did say that "circumstances which may imply an ease-
ment in favor of the grantee may not be sufficient to imply one in
favor of the grantor ,,7 which indicates that a reservation re-
quires a higher degree of necessity than an implied grant. It is a
reasonable conclusion that Kentucky is actually applying the same
doctrine to the grantor and grantee, and at the same time paying
homage to a common law rule of construction that a grant will be
construed more strongly against the grantor than the grantee, since
it is doubtful that an easement would have been implied even in
favor of the grantee on these facts.
While the Kentucky court has not always carefully distinguished
the two kinds of implied easements, they have reached the right re-
sult in most cases. However, this failure to properly classify the type
of easement has lead to considerable confusion since it cannot be
readily ascertained with which type of easement the court is dealing
without a careful analysis of the case.
ERNEsT W RrVERs
EVICTION UNDER A COVENANT OF GENERAL
WARRANTY IN KENTUCKY
A covenant of general warranty is a covenant in a deed conveying
land warranting that the grantee will receive such title as the deed
purports to convey, and in legal effect, it is a covenant that the grantee
and those who claim under him will not be evicted from the land by
someone who has a paramount right or title which was in existence
at the time of conveyance." There is no breach of this covenant
until there has been an eviction under such a paramount right or title.
2
An actual eviction is a dispossession or ouster of the covenantee
from the property This may be under compulsion of law or physical
force or, generally, it may be a voluntary moving in the face of an
asserted valid paramount claim.2 A constructive eviction is also
Id. at 855, 233 S.W 2d at 975.
For further confusion on the point, see Swinney v. Haynes, 236 S.W 2d
705 (Ky., 1951).
'4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY sec. 1010, et. seq. (3rd ed. 1939); 172 A.L.R. 20.
4 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sees. 1013 and 1014.
RAiWLE, COVENANTS FOR TrrLE 256 (2nd ed. 1854); 4 TIFFANY, Onl. cit.
supra, note 1, sec. 1013.
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recognized by the overwhelming weight of authority,4 but there is
not complete agreement as to what amounts to a constructive eviction.
It is generally held that there is a constructive eviction when the
premises are m the possession of the holder of the paramount title at
the time of the conveyance so that the covenantee does not and
cannot obtain possession.5 It is likewise held that there is a con-
structive eviction where the covenantee is in possession and subse-
quently purchases the paramount title or leases under it without
actually leaving the land.6
Kentucky does not follow the general rules as to what is sufficient
to constitute an eviction. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has fre-
quently stated the proposition that a judgment sustaining the validity
of the outstanding title is necessary, with certain exceptions, before
there is an eviction upon which an action for breach of the covenant
of warranty can be based. An examination of the Kentucky cases
has led the writer to the conclusion that this proposition accurately
states the Kentucky law
The requirement of a judgment means that there must be a law-
suit between the holder of the paramount title or right and the
covenantee, and, out of that suit, a judicial determination that the
title or claim asserted adversely to the covenantee is paramount. The
judgment alone is sufficient to constitute an eviction and there need
be no execution or dispossession under it.7 It is said that after the
judgment, the covenantee is under a duty to yield possession and he
has no right to resist." Since there is no requirement of an actual
ouster or dispossession in such a case, it appears that this is one situa-
tion in which Kentucky recognizes a type of constructive eviction.
Since this view of requiring a judgment in order for there to be
an eviction is a peculiar one and is unsupported by the vast weight
of authority9 it seems desirable to examine the Kentucky cases to
see where and why such a rule grew up in this state and how it has
been developed.
The earliest statement found in a Kentucky case as to what con-
1172 A.L.R. 21.
' RAWLE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 257- 4 TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra, note 1,
sec. 1013; 172 A.L.R. 27.
* lbid.
* Hubbard v. Stanaford, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1044, 100 S.W 232 (1907); Stirman s
Adm r. v. Hahn, 4 Ky. Op. 515 (1871); see Woodward v. Allen, 33 Ky. (3 Dana)
164 (1835); Radcliff v. Ship, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 299, 300 (1808). Contra: Arnold
v. Maiden, 10 Ky. Op. 288 (1879).
' Hubbard v. Stanaford, supra note 7, 1045; Stirnan s Adm r. v. Hahn, supra
note 7; Woodward v. Allan, supra note 7; Radeliff v. Ship, supra note 7.
94 TiF.iY, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 1013; 172 A.L.R. 56.
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stitutes an eviction was m Radcliff v Ship,1 a case decided m 1808.
That case held that a judgment is sufficient to constitute an eviction.
In Bookers Admnmstrator v Bell," decided m 1815, there was also a
judgment, but the court said, by way of dictum, that "An eviction may
be either with or without the judgment of a Court."1 2 However, m
Fowler v Chiles,13 a case m which there was no judgment but there
was an actual dispossession, the rule that a judgment is sufficient to
constitute an eviction was apparently changed to the rule that a judg-
ment is necessary before there can be an eviction. It was there held
that an actual dispossession without a judgment is not an eviction.
The court, m that case, may have mistakenly adopted such a rule
because of the fact that the prior Kentucky cases, m which the ques-
tion as to the sufficiency of an eviction was raised, involved judgments
and their sufficiency 14
In 1836, in Vanmetre v Griffith,15 it was said that a covenantee
cannot, before eviction, purchase the outstanding paramount title and
continue in possession and sue for breach of warranty, but must, if
the covenantor refuses to consider him as his agent or trustee m the
matter, surrender possession acquired from him and use the new
title in warfare against the old. 10 This was a case m which the vendee
contracted with the paramount title holder to purchase such paramount
title if successfully asserted. After it-was successfully asserted and a
court judgment obtained, the vendee attempted to collect damages
from the vendor measured by the original purchase price, which ex-
ceeded the amount which the vendee paid to buy m the paramount
title. The result reached limited recovery to the amount paid for
the paramount title, and this was sound; but the court, instead of
placing the result on established principles as to the correct measure
of damages m such a situation, disregarded the judgment and stated
an equitable principle which is not generally applied to a vendee
m regard to his remedies on his covenants.' 7 While the case is sound
m result and is difficult to generalize on its facts, its language does
'°3 Ky. (Hardin) 299 (1808).
6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 173 (1813).
"Id. at 174.
"27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 504 (1830).
"Reeds Heirs v. Hormback, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 375 (1830); Cummins
v. Kennedy, 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 118 (1823); Gaither v. Brooks, 8 Ky. (1 A. K.
Marsh) 409 (1818); Cox v. Strode, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 4 (1815); Bookers Admr. v.
Bell's Exr., 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 173 (1813); Radcliff v. Ship, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 299
(1808).
'534 Ky. (4 Dana) 89 (1836); cf. Nolan v. Feltman, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 119
(1876).
"Vanmetre v. Griffith, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 89, 92 (1836).
"See ALE, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 294, esp. n. 2.
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allow a construction to the effect that a covenantee cannot buy m
an asserted paramount claim before an adverse judgment and assert
an eviction. In Huff v Cumberland Valley Land Co.,iS decided in
1895, it was, however, actually held that the buying up by the
covenantee of an asserted paramount title without a judgment is not
an eviction. The court cited no authority or precedent for such a
holding and did not attempt to rationalize it.
In Walker v Robinson,19 in 1915, it was again held that there
must be a judgment for there to be an eviction and that an actual
dispossession is not sufficient. In that case, the paramount title was
an easement and the covenantee submitted to it, which was all the
dispossession possible in such a situation.
In Waggener v Howsley s Administrator,-20 also decided in 1915,
the court again reiterated the rule that there can be no eviction with-
out a judgment.21 However, on the facts of the case, such a holding
was not necessary because, here, the vendee sought out the owner
of the paramount claim and purchased it without its ever having
been hostily asserted. It is doubtful whether this would be an
eviction even in the states which allow the buying up of a paramount
claim to constitute an eviction, since there was no hostile assertion
and threatening of possession.2 2 It is worthwhile to note that the
only cases cited by the court in this case in support of its statement
of the Kentucky rule requiring a judgment were Huff v Cumberland
Valley Land Co.,2 3 a case involving the buying up of an asserted
paramount title without any actual dispossession and Smith v Jones,-2 4
a case involving an incumbrance which had never been asserted. The
Kentucky cases stating the rule have all too often cited prior cases
in support of it with just such a failure to distinguish between the
various types of fact situations involved.
No other Kentucky cases were found by the writer which could
properly be considered as holding that a judgment is necessary to
constitute an eviction.
The Kentucky cases do recognize several exceptions to the rigid
rule. If the vendee never acquired possession, there is apparently
a breach of warranty without a judgment,2 3 although there are dicta
1817 Ky. L. Rep. 213, 80 S.W 660 (1895).
"163 Ky. 618, 174 S.W 503 (1915).
- 164 Ky. 113, 175 S.W 4 (1915).
m Id. at 120, 175 S.W at 7.
m 172 A.L.R. 30.
'17 Ky. L. Rep. 213, 80 S.W 660 (1895).
497 Ky. 670, 31 S.W 475 (1895).
'Stratton v. McGure, 249 Ky. 101, 60 S.W 2d 380 (1933); Eli v. Trent,
195 Ky. 26, 241 S.W 324 (1922); Foxwell v. Justice, 191 Ky. 749, 2,31 S.W 509
(1921); Pryse v. McGure, 81 Ky. 608 (1884).
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in several cases to the effect that a judgment is necessary even m
this situation. 20 It should be mentioned that three of the four cases
found which have held this sufficient without a judgment are cases
involving a peculiar situation; in that, in each, the breach of the cove-
nant was the fact that the minerals had been severed so that the
vendee acquired possession of them only as trustee when he acquired
possession to the surface. 27 The only reason the court has given for
this exception is that there could be no eviction when there was no
possession.
28
Generally, other states recognize that there is a sufficient evic-
tion where the vendee never acquires possession, but they treat it
as a constructive eviction rather than as an exception to the require-
ment of an eviction.2 9 In connection with this exception, attention
must be called to the fact that, m Kentucky, a deed to land which is
in the adverse possession of another is void and no action may be
maintained on the covenants contained m it.30 In most situations,
this probably makes the exception of little or no value. It has fre-
quently been stated that no eviction is necessary where the vendor
is insolvent or a non-resident,31 is about to remove his property from
the state,3 2 or is guilty of fraud.33 These have been called the equit-
able grounds of relief to prevent irreparable injury 34 Thus, it has
been held that where the vendor was guilty of fraud,35 or where he
was both insolvent and a non-resident,36 the vendee may recover on
his warranty without obtaining a judgment. However, there must
be a real danger of immediate or ultimate loss of the land before the
"' See Jones v. Avondale Heights Co., 243 Ky. 135, 139, 47 S.W 2d 949, 951
(1932); Huff v. Cumberland Valley Land Co., 17 Ky. L. Rep. 213, 30 S.W 660
(1895); Fowler v. Chiles, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 504, 506 (1830).
'Stratton v. McGuire, 249 Ky. 101, 60 S.W 2d 880 (1933); Eli v. Trent,
195 Ky. 26, 241 S.W 324 (1922); Foxwvell v. Justice, 191 Ky. 749, 231 S.W
509 (1921).
'-Pryse v. McGuire, 81 Ky. 608, 612 (1884).
'See note 5 supra.
' Pioneer Coal Co. v. Asher, 210 Ky. 498, 276 S.W 487 (1925).
See Jones v. Avondale Heights Co., 243 Ky. 135, 47 S.W 2d 949, 951
(1932); Harper v. Wilson, 223 Ky. 390, 392, 3 S.W 2d 769, 770 (1928);
Kmght's Adm'r v. Schroader, 148 Ky. 610, 612, 147 S.W 378, 379 (1912); Smith
v. Jones, 97 Ky. 670, 674, 31 S.W 475, 476 (1895); Laevison v. Biard, 91 Ky.
204, 206, 15 S.W 252 (1891).
See Knight's Adm r. v. Schroader, supra note 34.
See Jones v. Avondale Heights Co., 243 Ky. 135, 139, 47 S.W 2d 949, 951
(1932); Harper v. Wilson, 223 Ky. 390, 392, 3 S.W 2d 769, 770 (1928); Knight's
Admr v. Schroader, 148 Ky. 610, 612, 147 S.W 378, 379 (1912); Smith v. Jones,
97 Ky. 670, 674, 31 S.W 475, 476 (1895); Laevison v. Baird, 91 Ky. 204, 206,
15 S.W 252 (1891),
See Knght's Adm r. v. Schroader, supra note 36.
Crawford v. Baker, 235 Ky. 784, 32 S.W 2d 340 (1930).
T Little v. Bishop, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1747, 61 S.W 464 (1901); Merrifield v.
Tyler, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 422 (abstract) (Super. Ct., 1886).
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action may be maintained.3 7  It has also been said that an action on
the covenant of warranty may be maintained without a judicial evic-
tion if the vendee is disturbed m his possession by the acts of the
vendor.
38
In connection with this discussion of the Kentucky cases involving
an eviction, reference should be made to the statement frequently
made by the Kentucky Court that the covenant of general warranty
contains all the common law covenants.39 This apparently does not
mean that the deed will be read as if all the common law covenants
were expressly stated m it, but rather, that a situation which amounts
to a breach of any of the common law covenants, such as the existence
of an incumbrance or lack of seism, will be considered to be a breach
of the covenant of general warranty, where that is the covenant relied
upon, but only if there is an eviction. Therefore, while it is said that
the covenant of general warranty contains all the common law cove-
nants, it is still prospective in nature and is not breached until there
is an eviction.
40
It is difficult to question the reasons for requiring a judgment m
order for there to be an eviction since no statement of the reasons
for such a rule was found, by the writer, in the cases. Apparently,
the rule grew up and perpetuated itself without any outside author-
ity and without any rationalization which the courts thought worthy
of mention. As a result, the argument against the reasons for the
rule must be based on an assumption of reasons, and such assumption
of reasons is based on mere speculation. Actually the effect of the
Kentucky rule is to necessitate two lawsuits where one would do.
While it may appear desirable that the issue of paramount title be
tried in an action in which the one who claims such title is a party,
the Kentucky rule does not necessarily produce such a result, since
the determination of the issue of paramount title, m the suit between
the vendee and the claimant of the paramount title, is not binding on
the vendor, as between him and the vendee, where he has not been
notified of the suit and requested to defend.4 1 For the same reason, the
"'Todd v. Finley, 166 Ky. 546, 179 S.W 455 (1915); Kmght's Admr. v.
Schroader, 148 Ky. 610, 147 S.W 378 (1912).
"See Fowler v. Chiles, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh) 504, 505 (1830).
See Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27 241 S.W 324 (1922); Waggener v. Hows-
leys Admr., 164 Ky. 113, 120, 175 S.E. 4, 7 (1915).
' Harper v. Wilson, 223 Ky. 390, 3 S.W 2d 769 (1928); Walker v. Robinson,
163 Ky. 618, 174 S.W 503 (1915); see Kentucky Nat. Park Comm. v. Dennison,
281 Ky. 61, 65, 134 S.W 2d 973, 976 (1939). Contra: Walker v. Bartlett, 4 Kv.
L. Rep. 367 (abstract) (Super. Ct., 1882). See 4 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 1,
sec. 1013.
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rule does not necessarily prevent the trying of title to land m a suit
for money damages based on breach of contract, and there would seem
to be no reason why such a prevention would be desirable in the first
place. There does not appear to be any more danger of fraud between
the vendee and the one asserting the paramount claim in a situation m
which a default judgment can be obtained than in one in which there
may be a voluntary submission. If the basis for the rule is some feel-
ing upon the part of the court that a grantee should not be allowed
to disput his grantor s title, such a principle has no application where
covenants in a deed are involved, since such a dispute must always
occur before the covenants can be enforced or given effect. It is
therefore submitted that the Kentucky rule is undesirable because,
without sufficient reason, it requires an unnecessary multiplicity of
law suits.
Jms C. BLAIR
DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION IN KENTUCKY
It has long been recognized that one of the incidents of owner-
ship of property is the right to convey it. Consequently, the law will
not permit this right of ownership to be unduly limited by the im-
position of restraints by grantors or testators who endeavor to dispose
of their property and at the same time maintain control over its aliena-
tion or use. The law seeks to encourage the ready alienation of prop-
erty and to discourage restraints upon alienation which would have
the effect of withdrawing such property from the ordinary channels
of trade and commerce. For these reasons, conditions operating as
restraints on alienation are usually held to be void as contrary to
public policy With some exceptions to be noted, this principle
applies to all interests in property, whether real or personal, legal or
equitable, and whether present or future. It applies to interests in
fee simple and to legal life estates.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the different types of direct
restraints on alienation, with special emphasis on Kentucky law, and
to determine the basis for the rules which the law has established in
its treatment of these restraints. It is not concerned with indirect
restraints on alienation which arise when an attempt is made to ac-
"Jones v. Caidwell, 176 Ky. 15, 195 S.W 122 (1917); see Burchett v. Black-
bume, 198 Ky. 304, 306, 248 S.W 853, 854 (1923) and cases cited thereto.
